In terms of and social the of the 1980-1 riots was equally and . Part of this , as outlined above, resulted from the Government's strenuous efforts to any between its and the outbreak of violence and disorder. This was particularly important, since at the time the Thatcher was going through a bad in terms of popular opinion on such as unemployment, social services, and housing. While Lord Scarman was careful not to enter the political dispute between the Government and the party on such as unemployment and housing, his call for more direct action to deal with these problems, along with racial disadvantage, a to the political legitimacy of the which the Government had followed from 1979 onwards. It also a delicate problem for the Home Secretary himself, since Lord Scarman had been appointed by him to carry out his Inquiry. Having spent the whole summer any between its and the riots, the Government had to tread warily in to the and social proposals of the Scarman Report when it was in November 1981.

The parliamentary on the Report showed the Home Secretary adopting a two-pronged in his . First, he accepted many of the recommendations of the Report, particularly in relation to the of the police. Additionally, he accepted the need to tackle racial disadvantage and other social . Second, he the Government's view that, whatever broader measures were taken to deal with racial and social inequalities, the immediate was to and order on the streets. When the Home Secretary talked of the need for the Government to give a lead in tackling racial disadvantage he therefore saw this as in for the longer term. On the other hand, he was much more about the reform of the police and the development of new tactics and for the management of urban disorder (Hansard, . 14, 10 December 1981).

In 1985, however, the Government calls for another inquiry like Lord Scarman's, arguing that since the riots were a "criminal enterprise" it was useless to search for social explanations or to have yet another report advising it about what to do. , the Government was saying that it knew what the problems were, and how they could be tackled.

While some senior policemen, like Metropolitan Police Sir Kenneth Newman, wanted to the between the police and other areas of "social " (Metropolitan Police, 1986), the official government attempted to the riots and see them as the actions of a small who were either criminalized or influenced by extreme political ideas. The of the Government attempted to two main arguments.

1. that the riots were "a lust for blood", an "orgy of thieving", "a cry for loot and not a cry for help";
2. that the riots did not reflect a failure to carry out the "urgent programme of action" recommended by Lord Scarman in 1981, but were the of a spiralling wave of crime and disorder in inner-city .

The of this approach, articulated by Home Secretary Douglas Hurd most clearly, was that the riots were both "unjustifiable" and a "criminal activity". In a widely reported speech to police chiefs at the time of the disorders Hurd made this point clear:

Handsworth needs more and better housing. But riots only destroy. They nothing except a climate in which necessary development is even more difficult. Poor housing and other social ills provide no kind of reason for riot, arson and killing. One interviewer asked me whether the riot was not a cry for help by the rioters. The sound which law-abiding people heard at Handsworth was not a cry for help but a cry for loot. That is why the first , once public order is , must be a thorough and relentless into the crimes which were . (Daily Telegraph , 14 September 1985)

Such arguments resonated through the and in the various parliamentary during September and October 1985. They became part of the political language through which the riots were understood by makers and by popular opinion.

Since the 1985 unrest, and particularly after the 1987 General Election, the Government has announced a number of on the inner city, and it has presented these as part of an effort to rejuvenate areas on a sound basis. The that has since then, however, points to a discrepancy between the Government's promises of action and the of to them (Robson, 1988). It is perhaps too early to reach a on this point, but a repeat of the of inaction between 1982 and 1985 seems to be , within the current political context. A number of local have attempted to take more action to deal with the raised by the 1985 riots, but their experience has shown that such local are often severely limited by the actions of national government, the police, and broader and political pressures.

In the years since 1981 the one to urban unrest has been the provision of more , more training, and more to the police. Instead of tackling the causes of urban unrest, the Government has built up force to deal with the manifestation of those root conditions.

Increasingly the most strident political voices are raised in the name of free enterprise and law and order, not for equity and social justice. For the New Right and other influential of political opinion the attempt to achieve equality through and political means is at best na‹ve political folly, and at worst a on the workings of the market. The present political climate gives little cause for optimism that a change in governmental in this field is likely (Solomos, 1989).

The Government's plan of Action for Cities (DoE, 1987), after Mrs Thatcher's post-election promise, says very little directly about racial inequality. It remains to be seen whether it will suffer the fate of numerous other on the inner cities and fade into obscurity. But one thing seems clear: during the past the Government has been more intent on reducing the powers of local than on providing for changes in the social conditions of the inner cities.

(Tackling The Inner Cities By Susanne MacGregor And Ben Pimlott)