This article the behind the formation of the first and second National Governments, examining in particular the of the king in the formation of the two governments - a which, as will be seen, was rather more important than is usually thought.

The key to the formation of the first National Government lies in the parliamentary arithmetic facing the second government as it to its programme of in August 1931. was the largest party with 288 MPs; the Conservatives, who had gained more votes than in the 1929 general election, were, , only the second largest party with, by 1931, 262 MPs; and the had fifty-nine MPs. There were a further ten independents and five MPs who owed allegiance to Sir Oswald Mosley's short-lived New party, formed after Mosley's defection from in February 1931.

It followed, therefore, that if the Government was to acceptance of its package, it had to the support of MPs from either the or the Conservative party. This of the parliamentary arithmetic is by many writers on the 1931 crisis.

They consider, sometimes in fairly terms, the kinds of which might have adopted, without asking whether such had any chance of parliamentary support. A policy of Keynesian , for example, whatever its merits, had no chance whatever of gaining support in the conditions of August 1931. Nor would adoption of a tariff obviate the need for , given that the Conservatives insisted upon severe retrenchment, whether combined with a tariff or not.

The Cabinet was, it is clear, united in its view that the budget had to be balanced. What it could not agree on was how the budget was to be balanced; and it was this disagreement that led to the break-up of the government. It is sometimes said that the dissident in the Cabinet, led by Henderson, were not willing to accept cuts in unemployment . That is not strictly true. They were willing to accept a cut in which would have had the effect of "throwing at least some of those receiving transitional benefit upon public ", while Henderson pressed hard for a "premium", a flat of 1s. a week from all unemployment . What the dissidents objected to was a cut in the standard rate of . The whole Cabinet agreed that there should be a cut in the amount that the unemployed were receiving; where they disagreed was in whether this should include a cut in the standard rate of .

The opposition parties, however, were unwilling to accept any programme of which did not a cut in the standard rate of . As the dissidents in the Cabinet recognised, they did not have the power - they were a in the Cabinet as well as in the Commons - to avoid such a cut; all that they could do was to ensure that it was not a government which it. Those who blame for not an set of more socially just proposals in the conditions of August 1931 ought rather to blame the electorate for not giving support to form a government in 1929. In a situation, some form of power-sharing - even if it did not necessarily coalition - was .

Parliamentary arithmetic dictated, therefore, that would have to produce a package which was acceptable to at least one of the opposition parties. This the Cabinet was unable to . The question then arose of what government was . Such a government had to be able to carry a programme of through the House of Commons: this immediately ruled out the possibility of a Labour government led by Henderson, as suggested by Moodie in an otherwise illuminating article. It was quite clear that Henderson, the leader of the dissident minority in the Cabinet, had no chance whatever of producing a programme which could the support of a Commons . If, therefore, the King had turned to Henderson after MacDonald had proffered his resignation, or had the views of Privy Counsellors as suggested by Herbert Morrison, he could have been accused of wasting valuable time. In the existing conditions of financial crisis, it was essential for a government to be formed which could ensure a parliamentary in support of the measures so that they could pass the Commons. Without some grasp of this basic it is impossible to understand what followed.

(20th Century British History by Vernon Bogdanor)